Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Linda Anderson fka Linda LaRee Thompson v.
Glenn Hunter Thompson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David J. Friel; Attorney for Petitioner.
Bruce L. Richards; Dean A Stuart; Bruce L. Richards and Associates; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Anderson v. Thompson, No. 20070514 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/333

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

EJTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson).
Petitioner,
Appelate Case No. 20070¥K,
v.
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,
Respondent.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
JUDGE MARK S. KOURiS

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLAN

David L FrieS
Attorney for Petitioner
f'k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84! 19
Telephone (801)975-861!

Bruce L. Richards
Dean A. Stuart
Brace L. Richards and Associal:
Attorneys for Respondeo f.
1S05 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 34125-0786
Telephone (801) 972-0307

ORAL ARGUMENT' IS REOURSTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB 2 9 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson),
Petitioner,

]
]
]
)

Appellate Case No. 20070176

v.
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,
Respondent.

;
]

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

David J. Friel
Attorney for Petitioner
f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801) 975-8611

Bruce L. Richards
Dean A. Stuart
Bruce L. Richards and Associates
Attorneys for Respondent
1805 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786
Telephone (801) 972-0307

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Contents

2

Table of Authorities

3

Argument, Point I

4

Point II

5

Point III

6

Point IV

7

Point V

9

Point VI

10

Conclusion

11

Mailing Certificate

12

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Anderson v. Thompson. 594 U. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 2008)

6,9

Bettinger v. Bettinger. 793 P.2d 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

8

Ford v. Intermountain Farmers Ass.. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)

7

Kelly v. Kelly. 9 P.3d 171 (Utah App. 2000)

5

Marshv. Marsh. 973 P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)

4, 5

Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431 (Ut. App. Ct. 1999)

7

Taylor v.Hansen. 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

7

Web Bank v. American General Annuity Service Corp. 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002)

7, 8

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3

10, 11

Rule 24(a)(9) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

10

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF
CONTEMPT IS CONTRARY TO LAW. THE
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE
DISCRETION TO FIND APPELLANT IN
CONTEMPT.
Appellee argues that a decision to hold a party in contempt is discretionary with the trial
court. (Brief of Appellee Pg. 8). Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) is cited by
Appellee regarding the discretionary nature of holding a party in contempt. Marsh involved a
trial court's refusal to find the wife in a divorce related proceeding in contempt. The wife
violated a divorce decree by not making mortgage payments resulting in the property being lost
to foreclosure.
The husband argued wife should be held in contempt because wife failed to hold husband
harmless on the mortgage. The divorce decree specifically required wife to hold husband
harmless on the mortgage. The wife argued she was not able to make the payments because the
husband failed to pay child support. The District Court refused to hold the wife in contempt.
The Brief of Appellant specifies the requirements for contempt. These requirements are
not limited to discretion of a trial court. (Brief of Appellant Arguments Point I, through V, Pgs.
15-25). Marsh supports Appellant's position stating:
... To find contempt, the court must find from clear
and convincing proof that the contemnor knew what
was required, had the ability to comply, and
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
(Citation omitted.)
973 P.2d 988 @ 990.
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The legal standard established by the cases cited by Appellee support Appellant's
position. The District Court did not have discretion to find Appellant in contempt. The District
Court was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that an Order of Court was violated.
The specific knowledge, ability to comply and willful and knowing requirements must be met. If
discretion is to be exercised it is after the legal requirements have been met.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO MAKE
FINDINGS ON THE THREE ELEMENTS
REQUIRED FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT.
Appellee argues that the Court finding that Respondent was aware of the Decree and had
the capacity to follow the Decree is sufficient. (Brief of Appellee Pgs. 9-14.) However, Kelly v.
Kelly, 9 P.3d 171, (Utah App. 2000), requires clear and convincing proof of all three elements of
contempt. Marsh v. Marsh, infra as cited in Point I establishes the same requirement. The
District Court's findings do not include these three elements.
Being aware that there was a Decree of Divorce does not meet the requirement that the
Appellant knew what was required. While the Appellee argues that the District Court found that
the Respondent had the ability to comply with the Decree, there is no finding as to what was
required by the Decree itself. The ability to comply requirement isn't met unless what is
required is established and the ability to comply is then determined. Finally, there is no finding
that the Appellant acted willfully. Consequently, the Appellee's position that the trial court
made the proper findings and properly applied the law is wrong. The Appellee does not address
the error with the Court's findings being found by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellant points out the errors by the District Court without Appellee addressing the
errors. For example, Finding of Fact 3 by the Court is not responded to by Appellee. This
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Finding suggests Appellant should have lied to his children. This is not a basis for finding the
Appellant had the ability to comply with the Decree.
POINT III
APPELLEE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTS TO
UTILIZE FINDINGS RESPECTING PRIOR
EVENTS AS THE BASIS FOR FINDING A
SUBSEQUENT EVENT TO CONSTITUTE
CONTEMPT.
Apellee argues that the District Court's finding of contempt is justified by noncompliance by Appellant of a previous Court Order. (Brief of Appellee Pgs. 13-14.) The
previous proceedings involved unrelated issues. The previous issues related to additional child
support based on business gross receipts and similar matters. The District Court's ruling
involving these prior issues does not replace legal requirements for finding contempt. The
statutory, constitutional and judicial requirements that Appellant knew what was required, had
the ability to comply and intentionally failed or refused to do so are not based on prior
proceeings.
Appellee also argues that a judgment remained unpaid. Not only does the judgment from
the prior proceedings not relate to the current issues, the judgment is not subject to paymenx.
The Appellant posted a supersedeas bond upon the filing of the appeal. A party cannot be held
in contempt while exercising the party's right to appeal.
As Appellee noted, this Court issued an opinion in the appeal of the earlier proceedings
on January 3, 2008. This decision, Anderson v. Thompson, 594 Ut. Adv. Rep 3 (Ut. Ct. App.
2008), reversed the District Court regarding evidence wrongly admitted from settlement
documents, affirmed the District Court regarding the amounts owed by Appellant and reversed
and remanded the case regarding attorney's fees. The remand is still before the District Court.
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This prior appeal is not a basis for the District Court's finding of contempt in the second
proceeding. There is no iintiing by iwc i>:siiici t

OLJ.-I I.U.I

ii.ese laciors. me unpa... :•,;; indued

for judgment or additional child support had not been paid formed the basis for the District
Court's finding of contempt in the second proceeding. If this were the case, such a position
would be an abuse of discretion by the Court. The basis for the action was a family meeting and
two checks. Prior findings of contempt on unrelated issues are not at issue in this case. If they

POINT I \
A l)i VOilCE DECRPP IS IN fPRPRKrhl) I :M .:G
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION RULES.
Appellee argues that the Decree of Divorce is to be interpreted as an Order of Court..
((kief of Appellee I\i. I(' ) \\ illmnf u'tiiU', aullmrih, Appellee slates "a nianiagc may fx- an
enforceable contract between two individuals bul the resulting Decree of Divorce is not a
contr - . - • ' .

•

i -* '

i •• ' .- • a • ru1 • > a

interpretation of a conliacl. In Moonjy'._Moo.n, 973 P.2d 43 ! (la \i>(>. * 9'^)*. the Court stated:
"w e interpret a di\ orce decree according to established i "tiles of conti act interpi etation ' ' Se e
also, Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (I Jt. App. 1998) and Ford v. Intermountain Farmers
Association, 90 ; I \2d 264, 268 (I Jtah 1995).
In Web Bank v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 vUt. 2002), the
Utah Supreme court stated the fundamental rules of construction applicable to a contract. The
Court stated:
In interpreting a contract, "we look to the writing
itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we
consider each contract provision... in relation to all
of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all
and ignoring none." (Citations omitted.)

7

The Appellee acknowledges that the Order of Court Appellee relies on is one phrase from
one sentence in one paragraph related to joint custody. (Brief of Appellee Pg. 9.) The
interpretation rules applicable to such a phrase as explained in the Brief of Appellant and as
stated in Web Bank require giving all provisions of an Order effect. Appellee's interpretation is
wrong. A phrase contained in a sentence contained in a paragraph related to joint custody cannot
be singled out and given separate meaning apart from the rest of the paragraph.
In Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990), the Court faced an issue of
interpretation regarding a divorce decree. The Court stated:
A judgment must be enforced as written if the
language is clear and unambiguous. However,
ambiguous judgments are subject to the same rules
of construction that apply to all written instruments
and "the entire record may be resorted to for the
purpose of construing the judgment". The
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is,
at the outset, a question of law. "If a trial court
finds the agreement unambiguous and interprets its
meaning by examining only the words of the
agreement, this interpretation also presents a
question of law." Therefore, we are not required to
give the trial court interpretation of an unambiguous
judgment any particular weight, but review its
interpretation under a correctness standard.
However, if the trial court determines the language
is ambiguous and finds facts based upon extrinsic
evidence, appellate review of such findings is
limited to determining whether they are based on
substantial, competent, admissible evidence.
The language of Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce is clear and unambiguous when
the entire Paragraph is considered. This Paragraph establishes joint custody. To reach
Appellee's interpretation as adopted by the District Court, one single phrase is given effect and
the rest of the Paragraph is ignored. At best, the Appellee's argument suggests there is
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ambiguity as to what Paragraph 3 means. The District Court,, however, did not rule, as a matter
of law, that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous.
POINT V
T H l S U H J K l j N 111I-: 1-1KST APPEAL Ol- i i ! :•
MATTLR, ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. FEES MUST
MEET THE REQUIREMENT S OF UTAH CODE
ANN. §30-3-3. FINDINGS MEETING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE MI 1ST BE
MADE.
In Anderson v. Thompson, 594 I I. Adv. Rep. 3, the Court addressed attorney's fees in
circumstances w here the Com I: f()i md A ppellant o;vv ed additional child si ippoi I: and other amounts
aiici was in contempt of c oui t. 1 his (\nirl ruled (hat (he requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3

the necessary findings. This Court stated:
icr Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may
T a party to pay the costs, attorney's fees, and
.»•.. iess fees... of the other party to enable the other
party to prosecute or defend the action." "!n doing
so, however, the trial court must base its award of
attorney's fees "on evidence of the receiving
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees" further, "the decision to award attorney's
r
.- V must be based on sufficient findings regarding
HuMors"' (Citations omitted.)
1

lerson v. Thompson, 594 I . Adv. Rep. 3. -a par. 4'i (I Jt Ct. App 2008).
1 he District Coi trt in this proceeding did not apply I Itah Code A nn §30-3-3 ' I he

District Court did not make the findings required by Anderson v. Thompson. The District court
further refused to awai d fees to i Appellant oi reduce t appellee's fees based on the i Vppel h iiit
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prevailing on the significant issue in this proceeding. This issue was Appellee's claim that
Appellant owed more child support in January, February and March, 2007.
The District Court's refusal to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees is
specifically addressed by Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-33(2) apply to this proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides:
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parenttime, child support, alimony, or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney's fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against the party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the
reasons for not awarding fees.
In this case, the trial court did not apply this statute. The Court did not consider that the
Appellant was the prevailing party on the claim that the Appellant had not paid the correct child
support for January, February and March, 2007. The Appellant, the prevailing party, should
have been able awarded his costs attorney's fees with respect to the issue of child support. This
fee award would apply unless the District Court found the Appellee impecunious or entered
reasons for not awarding fees.
POINT VI
THE REQUIRED FACTS FOR DECIDING THIS
APPEAL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED.
Appellee argues that how the appeal should be dismissed because the facts were not
marshaled. (Brief of Appellee Argument: Point Two.) Appellee argues that a Finding of Fact is
being challenged and all record evidence supporting the finding has not been marshaled. See
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9).
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The issues in this appeal involve errors of law by the District Court and the Findings of
the District Court that do not meet the requirements of law. The issues in this appeal are matters
of law. The issues of law are the constitutional requirement that a party be afforded due process
in a contempt proceeding; the statutory requirement that an Order of the Court be violated; the
making of Findings of Fact meeting the three requirements for contempt; finding that the
required Findings were found by clear and convincing evidence; and complying with Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-3 regarding attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the District Court decision. There is no violation of an
Order of Court meeting the constitutional, statutory and judicial requirements for a finding of
contempt. There has been no finding by clear and convincing evidence of any violation of a
legally sufficient Court Order. Attorney's fees should have been awarded to the Appellant. This
case should be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorney's fees including fees on
appeal.
Dated this 25th day of February, 2008.
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES
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